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IMPLYING PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION FROM FEDERAL
STATUTES:
AMTRAK AND CORT APPLY THE BRAKES
INTRODUCTION
The implication of private causes of action from criminal and
regulatory statutes that do not expreSsly provide for such actions is a
practice in which the federal courts have long engaged.' In recent
years, some courts have been increasingly willing to imply private
causes of action. 2 This favorable disposition is probably derived from
the liberal views on implied remedies3 expressed by the Supreme
Court in J./. Case Co. .v. Borah.' However, the Court's most recent de-
cisions on the subject, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National As-
sociation of Railroad Passengers 5 (Amtrak) and Curt v. Ash,' appear to be
designed to curb the rapid proliferation of implied remedies.'
This comment will discuss the doctrine of implied remedies and
the new decisions' probable impact thereon. The origin and develop-
ment of implied remedies will first be examined briefly, beginning
with the Court's bold pronouncement in Texas & Pacific Railway v.
Rigsby,' proceeding through the Court's more conservative years fol-
lowing that decision and from these conservative years into the liberal
period of the sixties and early seventies. Then the Amtrak and Curt de-
cisions will be examined closely. Finally, these two cases will be
evaluated in light of the opposing viewpoints on the propriety of im-
plied remedies. The proposition will be advanced that the rule an-
nounced in these cases — that the implication of a private remedy
must be consistent with the evident legislative intent and with the ef-
' Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) is usually cited as the first im-
plied remedy case. E.g:, Note, The Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title III of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 47 S. CAI,. L. REV. 383, 403 n.118 (1974).
2 Note, 51 TENAs L. REV, 804, 806 (1973).
" The phrase "implied remedy" is used' in this comment to mean the implication
of a private cause of action from a statute not expressly providing one in favor of the
plaintiff. This is to be distinguished from the implication of additional remedies in
favor of one who already has a private cause of action under a statute, see, e.g., Deckert
v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940). This comment will not deal with
the implication of additional remedies, nor with the implication of remedies from con-
stitutional provisions, see, e.g., Bivens v, Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
377 U.S. 426 (1964), discussed al notes 17-39 infra.
414 U.S. 453 (1974).
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
'The dissenting judge in the Cori circuit court decision viewed Amtrak as a clear
signal to the lower courts to decelerate the use of implied remedies. Con v. Ash, 496
F.2d 416, 429 (3d Cir, 1974) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Su-
preme Court's decision in the Cort case goes even further than Amtrak in imposing limi-
tations on the use of implied remedies, See discussion accompanying notes 77-101 infra.
"241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). The phrase "social policy approach", as used to describe
the Borah principle, was coined in Note, The Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under
Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 411 (1974).
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fectuation of congressional purpose, and also that the cause of action
may not be one traditionally relegated to state law — is desirable. It
generally allows a rational and justifiable distinction to he made be- •
tween cases in which remedies should and should not be implied.
I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED
REMEDIES
The doctrine of implied remedies is said to have first been ap-
plied in the federal courts in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 9 de-
cided in I916.'° Rigsby held that a railroad employee who was injured
because the railroad's equipment did not comply with the Safety Ap-
pliance Act'' had a cause of action against the railroad, even though
the Act did not expressly provide one." The Court stated: "A disre-
gard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it re-
sults in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the stat-
ute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in
default is implied ... ."' 3 Curiously, this sweeping pronouncement,
which appears to allow a private cause of action to be implied in favor
of virtually anyone injured by the violation of a federal statute, was
not employed to any great extent by the federal courts in the years
immediately following Rigsby. On the contrary, the creation of an im-
plied remedy was relatively unusual until recent times."
In the sixties and early seventies, federal courts began to imply
remedies more freely." The Supreme Court at first continued its cir-
241 U.S. 33 (1916).
t" E.g., Note, The Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title III of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, 47 S. CAL L. REv. 383, 403 n.118 (1974). It has been sug-
gested that Rigsby is not truly an implied remedy case. Gamin & Eisberg, The Implied
Rights Doctrine, 41 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 292, 293 n.4 (1972). The authors note that Rigsby
can he viewed as a negligence per se case in which the higher standard of conduct em-
bodied in the federal statute was applied to an existing cause of action. Id. A later in-
terpretation of Rigsby by the Court seems to support this point of view. See Tipton v.
Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 298 U.S. 141, 146-48 (1936). In any event, many subsequent
cases have adopted and used Rigsby to support the creation of an implied remedy. E.g.,
Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967); Curt v. Ash, 496 F.2d
416, 422 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
" 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970).
" 241 U.S. at 39.
"Id. This principle is now embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286
(1965).
14 Sonic of the few early implied remedy cases are: Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Reiumeister v. Reitmeister. 162 F.2d 691 (2d
Cir. 1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Neis-
wonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929).
1 ' The number of implied remedy cases greatly increased in this period. E.g.,
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.1. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Moses v. Bur-
gin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Burke v. Compania Mex-
icana de Aviation, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970); Pearlstein s'. Scudder & Ger-
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cumspect attitude toward the use of implied remedies. Thus, for a
time the Court limited the implication of remedies to cases in which a
specific congressional intent to have the courts provide such a remedy
could he discerned." However, this restrictive approach was dramati-
cally altered in J./. Case Co. v. Barak. t '
The plaintiff in Barak was a shareholder in the Case Company.
He alleged that the defendants had circulated false and misleading
proxy solicitations, in violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934" and Rule 14a-9 1 " which the Securities Exchange
Commission had promulgated thereunder, and that the merger of
Case and another corporation had been effected through the use of
these unlawfully solicited proxies. 2° The plaintiff sought both a de-
claratory judgment that the merger was void, and damages for him-
self and all other shareholders similarly situated!' Although section
14(a) did not expressly provide that a private individual might sue to
enforce its provisions, 22 the Supreme Court unanimously held that a
private action for damages could be maintained. 23
There is some uncertainty as to the basis of the Court's
holding. 24 The decision could arguably rest on either or both of two
grounds. 25 The Court. stated that the sole question raised was
"whether § 27 of the Act authorizes a federal cause of action for
rescission or damages to a corporate stockholder with respect to a
consummated merger which was authorized pursuant to the use of a
proxy statement alleged to contain false and misleading statements
violative of § 14(a) of the Act." 25 Section 27 grants exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts over all suits in equity and actions at law
brought, to enforce any liability or duty created by the Act or the rules
titan, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970): Gomez v, Florida State Employment Serv.. 417
F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969); Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803
(D.D.C. 1971); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969).
1 " Continent, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 959, 957-a8 (1968). SEE Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647, 651-52 (1963); T.1.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959); 'Tex-
tile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
11 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
1" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). This section makes it unlawful for any person to so-
licit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
'" 17 C.F.R. § 290.19a-9 (1974). This rule makes it unlawful to solicit any proxy
pursuant to a proxy statement which is false or misleading.
2" 377 U.S. at 929-30.
31 Id, at 430.
22 1 5 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970) gives the Commission the authority to bring civil ac-
tions to enjoin violations of the Act, or to transmit evidence of violations of the Act to
the Attorney General who may, in his discretion, institute criminal proceedings. This is
the only means that the Act specifically provides to enforce § 14(a).
22 377 U.S. at 430-31.
23 Comment, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454, 460.62 (1968).
" Id. at 460.	 •
2" 377 U.S. at 428.
55
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
thereunder. 27 In a very cursory statement, the Court concluded that
section 27 provides private parties with a right to bring suit for viola-
tion of section 14(a): "It appears clear that private parties have a right
under § 27 to bring suit for violation of § 14(a) of the Act. Indeed,
this section specifically grants the appropriate District Courts jurisdic-
tion over all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created' under the Act."" Thus, the Court apparently
reasoned that since section 14(a) of the Act imposes a duty on the de-
fendants not to circulate false and misleading proxy statements, and
since the plaintiff was suing to enforce that duty, section 27 au-
thorized the plaintiff's action.2 °
However, this reasoning begs the real question which was in-
volved in the case: whether the defendants had a duty or liability
toward the plaintiff, and if' so, whether that duty or liability could be en-
forced by the plaintiff. section 27 only grants the district courts juris-
diction to entertain suits to enforce the duties or liabilities created by
the Act; it does not appear that the section itself was intended to
create any duties or liabilities. 30 Thus, the source of the plaintiffs'
rights would have to be one of the substantive provisions of the Act,
and not this jurisdictional provision.
Courts have differed in their evaluation of the significance of
this first part of the Borak opinion. While no decision has been found
which concludes that the section 27 holding is the sole basis of the
Borak opinion, there are many decisions in which courts apparently
believe that this part of the opinion is an essential element of the
holding. 3 ' This position is arguably incorrect, however, since the Su-
preme Court itself has almost always interpreted Borak as standing for
an alternative principle, without giving mention to the section 27
holding."
This "second holding" of Borak concentrates on the necessity of
implying the private cause of action that the plaintiff had asserted.
The Court considered section I4(a) itself, and found that the section
had been enacted for broad remedial purposes. 33 This was evidenced
by the language of the section, which made it unlawful for any person
to solicit any proxy in contravention of rules and regulations pre-
scribed by the Commission as necessary or appropriate in the public
" 15U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
" 377 U.S. at 430-31.
39
 Comment, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 454, 461 (1968).
3° Id. at 461.
31 See, e.g., Schiafft) v. Helstoski, 492 F.2d 413, 425-26 (3d Cir. 1974); Holloway
v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
32 See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969); Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 0.13 (1968); Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. United States,
389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967). But see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 75 n.l I (1975) where the
Court places some emphasis upon the § 27 holding in Barak.
33
 377 U.S. at 431.
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interest or for the protection of investors."' It was noted that while
this language made no specific reference to a private right of action,
among its chief purposes was the protection of investors." Implied
judicial relief is necessary, the Court concluded, to achieve this legisla-
tive purpose of protecting investors." It was further stated that be-
cause enforcement of the proxy provisions is problematic, private en-
forcement of the proxy rules is also necessary as a supplement to
Commission action."' Based on this determination as to the need for
implied relief, the Court concluded: "We, therefore, believe that
under the circumstances here it is the duty of the courts to be alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the Congres-
sional purpose."" Significantly, the Court did not mention or discuss
congressional intent anywhere in the opinion. Thus, Barak has been
interpreted as establishing a test for implied remedies that does not
contain the element of congressional intent."
It is this second branch of the Borah case that has often been
employed by the federal courts in implied remedy cases.'" However,
some of the courts purporting to apply Barak have not confined them-
selves strictly to the rationale of that case, but have instead liberalized
its rule considerably. The recent case of Stewart v. Travelers Corp.'" is
illustrative of this trend.
The plaintiff' in Stewart alleged that he had been discharged by
the defendant corporation because his wages had been garnished. 42
The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 4 " makes it a crime to
discharge an employee for a single garnishment." The plaintiff had
first complained to the Department of Labor that his dismissal vio-
lated the Act, 45 but no action was taken on the claim." Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a civil action, requesting reinstatement., backpay,
punitive damages and attorney's fees." Although the Act does not
expressly provide for a private action for civil relief, the Ninth Circuit
" Id. at 431-32.
as Id. at 432.
ae Id.
" Id.
a " Id. at 433.
e Comment, 63 Nw. U.L. RI.W. 454, 463 (19(18).
4"
 E.g., Burke v, Coinpania Mexicana de Aviation, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th
Cir. 1970). See also cases cited in note 32 supra.
4i
 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974).
42 /d. at 109.
43 IS U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970).
44 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a)-(b) (1970). The penalty provided 1Or a wilful violation or
this subsection is a fine of not inure than $1000, or imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both.
" Under 15 U.S.C. § 1676 (1970), the Secretary of Labor, acting through the
Wage and Hour Division of the Deparunent or Labor, is charged with the duty or en-
fOreing § 1674.
" 503 F.2d at 109.
47 Id.
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held that such an action must be implied. 48
In making this determination, the court said that in the absence
of clear congressional intent to the contrary, courts are free to fashion
civil remedies where necessary to fully effectuate the congressional
purpose. 49
 This statment appears to be completely consistent with the
principles of Borak. However, further inspection of Stewart reveals that
the test it employed differs materially from the one stated in Borak.
The court noted that the necessity of implying a remedy would be de-
termined by whether the express remedies provided in the Act fully
effectuate the congressional purpose underlying the statute." And, in
making this determination, "the initial question is whether the
statute's protection might be enhanced by allowing private civil Feller"
It is submitted that implying remedies where necessary to
effectuate the congressional purpose is distinctly different from imply-
ing remedies where they might enhance the congressional purpose.
Unless the implication. of a private remedy would interfere with the
efficient administration of an act,s 2 it is difficult to conceive of a situa-
tion in which an implied private cause of action might not enhance a
statute's protection. Thus, the test used in Stewart is one that would
almost always justify the implication of a remedy. Apparently, it is this
type of free-wheeling approach to implied remedies which Amtrak was
intended to preclude."
II. THE AMTRAK DECISION
Amtrak was an action by the National Association of Railroad
Passengers (NARP) to enjoin the discontinuance of certain passenger
train routes on the ground that the discontinuance would violate the
Amtrak Act." The district court dismissed the action for lack of
"Id.
" Id. at 110, citing Burke v. Cornpania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d
1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1970).
'" 503 F.2d at 112.
51 Id. (emphasis added).
52 The court in Stewart recognized that a remedy should not be implied in such a
case. Id. at 112.
5,7
	dissenting judge in the Con circuit court decision viewed Amtrak as a signal
to the lower courts to decelerate the use of implied remedies. Con v. Ash, 496 F.2d
416, 429 (3d Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion) reu'd, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Supreme
Court's decision in the Cart case goes even further than Amtrak in imposing limits on the
use of implied remedies. See discussion at notes 77-101 infra.
54 414 U.S. at 454-55. The plaintiff alleged that the contract entered into by one
of the co-defendant railroads with Amtrak did not comply with the provisions of the
Amtrak Act. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. (1970). The Act prohibited a railroad from discon-
tinuing intercity passenger train service prior to January 1, 1975, unless it had entered
into a contract with Amtrak pursuant to 561(a)(1) of the Act. 45 U.S.C. §§ 561(a),
564(a) (1970). Plaintiff therefUre argued that the railroad could not discontinue its pas-
senger service until January 1, 1975, since no valid contract with Amtrak existed. Re-
view of Amtrak's actions allowing the railroad to discontinue its services was not availa-
ble under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970), since the
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standing. i 5 The Court. of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed.56 After finding that NARP had standing," the court held
that a private cause of action such as the plaintiff asserted could be
implied, even though the Amtrak Act did not expressly provide for
such an action. 58 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether such a private cause of action could be maintained," and de-
cided that it could not."
The Court first noted that the Act expressly authorized only an
action by the Attorney General, and a limited private cause of action,
in cases involving labor disputes." NARY argued, however, that al-
though the Act authorized certain suits, it did not thereby preclude
others. Relying on Barak, NARP contended that because railroad pas-
sengers were the intended beneficiaries of the Act, the Court should
imply a private cause of action whereby they could enforce com-
pliance with the Act's provisions." In replying to this argument, the
Court adopted the following two-part test: "It goes without saying ...
that the inference of such a private cause of action not otherwise au-
thorized by the statute must be consistent with the evident legislative
intent and, of course, with the effectuation of the purposes intended
to be served by the Act.""
Dealing first with the question of legislative intent, the Court
noted that the principle of statutory construction, expressio units est ex-
clusio alterius," would clearly compel the conclusion that Congress in-
tended the remedies created by the Act to be the exclusive means of
enforcing the duties and obligations imposed by the Act." It was
agreed, however, that the result reached by application of this maxim
Amtrak Act declares that the National Railroad Passenger Corporation will not be an
agency or establishment of the United States government, 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1970),
53 The opinion of the district court is unreported. 414 U.S. at 455 n.4. The case
was consolidated on appeal and reported as Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake &
0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973), read .u.di nom. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n R,R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
"" 475 F,2d at 340.
" Id. at 338.
55 Id. at 340.
"" 411 U,S. 981 (1973).
" 414 U.S. at 465.	 •
"' Id. at 457. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) provides that the district courts shall have juris-
diction upon petition of the Attorney General, or, in a case involving a labor agree-
ment, upon petition of any employee affected thereby, to grant such equitable relief as
may be necessary or appropriate to prevent or terminate any violation or threat of vio-
lation of the Act by the Amtrak corporation or any railroad,
" 414 U.S. at 457.
" id. at 457-58. It is interesting that the Court cited no cases in support of this
statement,
" "Expression of one thing is the exclusion or another. - BI„Acws LAW
DICTIONARY 692 (4th Rev. ed. 1968). The Court interpreted this maxim to that
when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not
expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies. 411 U.S. at 458.
" 5 414 U.S. at 458.
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would yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent." The legis-
lative history"" of the enforcement section of the Act" was then
examined," and it was found that there was evidence of an intent not
to allow private actions other than those specifically authorized by the
Act.'" Thus, the explicit legislative history of the enforcement section
served to support, rather than contradict, the interpretation accorded
by the settled rule of statutory construction,"
Although it had concluded that the implication of an implied
remedy in this case would have been inconsistent- with the evident
legislative intent, the Court also considered whether the implication of
a private cause of' action would be consistent with the effectuation of
the purposes that the Act was intended to serve." Relying once again
on legislative history, the Court characterized the purpose of the Act
as the preservation of passenger train service" and stated that one of
the means of achieving the Act's purposes was the quick and efficient
elimination of uneconomic routes." Allowing private actions to enjoin
proposed discontinuances would undercut, rather than complement
the efficient apparatus that Congress had provided for Amtrak to use
in the paring of' uneconomic routes." Thus, it was concluded that no
additional private cause of action to enforce compliance with the Act's
provisions could be properly inferred."
Ill. THE CORT DECISION
A more elaborate rule governing the use of implied remedies
was expressed in Core v. Ash." The plaintiff in Cort was a shareholder
of Bethlehem Steel Corporation who alleged that the defendants, di-
"Id.
"Sufrplemental Hearings on H.R. 17849 and S. 3706 before The Subcommittee on
Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. ser. 91 - 62, at 44 (1970), (hereinafter referred to as Supplemental
Hearings on H.R. 17849 and S.3706).
"45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970).
"414 U.S. at 458-61.
"Id. at 461. The Court noted that an amendment to the enforcement section of
the Act had been proposed that would have given any person adversely affected or ag-
grieved a right to sue, and that the Secretary or Transportation, who interpreted the
existing provision of the Act to allow only suits specifically authorized thereby, had
recommended that the proposed amendment not be adopted. Id. at 459-60, citing Sup-
plemental Hearings on H.R. 17849 and 5.3706, supra note 67, at 349. The Court then
said: "The Committee's deliberate failure to adopt that proposal, after learning of the
Secretary's views, cannot but give weight to the conclusion that the Committee agreed .
with the Secretary's interpretation of the meaning and effect of the existing language,
as well as with his opposition to the proposed change." Id. at 461.
7 ' Id.
7t hi. at 461-64.
"Id. at 461.
"Id.
"Id. at 463
"Id. at 465
" 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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rectors of the corporation, had caused Bethlehem to expend money in
the 1972 presidential election campaign in violation of federal law."
The plaintiff sought damages on behalf of the corporation, contend-
ing that although the election campaign law provided only for penal
sanctions, a derivative cause of action for his injuries as a shareholder
could be implied. 7 "
In reversing the court of appeals' holding" that a private cause
of action could he implied, the Court relied on a fou•-part test which
expanded upon the two-part Amtrak test:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted," ... that is, does the statute
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one ... Third, is
it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so
that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?"
Applying the first part of this test to the facts of the case, the
Court expressed concern as to whether a bare criminal statute could
ever be deemed sufficiently protective of some special group so as to
give rise to a private cause of action by a member of that group. 82
Final resolution of this issue was not necessary, however, because, re-
lying on legislative history, the Court concluded that protection of
stockholders was at best a subsidiary, purpose of the campaign expen-
diture laws."
With respect to the second part of the test, the Court found that
there was nothing in the legislative history of the statute 84 to suggest a
congressional intent to vest in corporate shareholders a federal right
to damages for the statute's violation." In situations in which the fed-
eral statute had clearly granted certain rights to a class of persons, the
Court stated, it would not be necessary for the plaintiff to show a
" Id. at 71. Plaintiff alleged that defendants had violated 18 U.S.C. .§ 610 (1970),
as amended, (Sel.P. II, 1972), which makes it unlawful for any corporation to make a con-
tribudon or expenditure in connection with any federal election, and provides criminal
penalties of a fine or imprisonment for its violation.
" 422 U.S. at 71.
"" 496 1.72d 416 (3d Cir. 1974). The district court decision, which is unreported,
granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that they were not liable
to plaintiff for the claimed violation of federal law. Id, at 418.
"' 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted). 	 •
" Id. at 78-80.
" 3 1d, at 80-82. The Court relied upon its prior examination of the Act's legisla-
tive history in United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
" 422 U.S. at 82,
85 Id.
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legislative intent to create a private cause of action, although it was
noted that an explicit statutory purpose to deny such a cause of action
would be controlling. 8 " But where, as here, it was at least dubious
whether Congress intended to vest in the plaintiff rights broader than
those provided by state regulation of corporations, the absence of any
evidence of congressional intent to allow a private cause of action
supported the conclusion that the legislative intent was to continue to
entrust to state law the relationship between corporations and their
stockholders."
The Court also found that the plaintiff' had failed to meet the
. third part of the test, since the remedy sought would not aid Con-
gress' primary purpose in enacting the statute, which was to assure
that federal elections were free loin the power of* corporate wealth. 88
Allowing the recovery of derivative damages by a corporation for vio-
lation of the statute arguably.would not deter the initial violation and
certainly would not undo the influence which the use of corporate
funds had had on a federal election.""
Finally, the Court determined that it would be entirely appro-
priate to relegate the plaintiff to whatever remedy was created by
state law." The regulation of the relationship between shareholders
and their corporations is ordinarily a matter of state law. Thus, it was
not necessary for federal law to intrude into the states' domain in this
case, in light of the fact that the existence of a derivative cause of ac-
tion for damages would not aid the primary goal of the statute."
IV. THE MEANING AND IMPACT OF AMTRAK AND CORT
Although the Cort test is set out in four parts, in fact it contains
only three distinct elements: the implied private cause of' action must
be consistent with legislative intent, it must be consistent with the
purposes underlying the statute, and it must not be a cause of action
traditionally relegated to state law." This last element is the only ad-
dition that Cori makes to the Amtrak test. The statement in Cort that a
plaintiff must be a member of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted is not a new element of the test for an implied
remedy, but rather an alternative way for the plaintiff to show that
the implication of a private cause of action in his favor would be con-
sistent with legislative intent. Amtrak stated only that the inference of a
private cause of action not otherwise authorized by statute must be
consistent with the evident legislative intent." This statement is capable
1d .
" M. at 82-84.
" Id. at 84.
" Id.
NO Id.
" Id. at 85.
" Id. at 78.
" 4t4 U.S. at 457-58.
62
IMPLYING PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
of supporting two entirely different interpretations. The Court could
have meant that there must be evidence of a specific legislative intent
to allow the particular remedy sought; 94
 or, it could have meant
merely that there must be evidence that Congress did not intend the
remedies provided by the statute to be exclusive — that Congress was
neutral as to whether additional remedies should be allowed.
Which of these two possible interpretations of Amtrak is correct is
now academic, however, since Cort embraces neither of them entirely.
Rather, it combines both to produce a new rule with respect to con-
gressional intent: where the plaintiff is a member of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, he need not show that
Congress intended to create a private cause of action in his favor."
The Supreme Court is apparently willing to infer this intent from the
plaintiff's special status as a member of a protected class." Where,
however, the plaintiff is not a member of a protected class, he will
have to show a specific congressional intent to create a private cause
of action in his favor."'
What of the plaintiff' who is a member of a protected class, but
who asserts an implied cause of action under a statute which already
provides private remedies? In Amtrak, the Court stated that where the
statute already provides private remedies, the principle of statutory
construction, expressio Imlay est exclusio aerials, would clearly compel
the conclusion that the remedies created by the Act were exclusive.""
This conclusion, however, would yield to clear evidence of contrary
legislative intent.""
This statement is subject to conflicting interpretations. It could
be argued that to establish a contrary legislative intent, the plaintiff in
such a case must prove that Congress intended to create a private
cause of action in his favor. It is also arguable, however, that to estab-
lish a contrary legislative intent, the plaintiff need only prove that
Congress did not intend that the remedies provided should be exclu-
sive, thus rebutting the presumption raised by expressio unius. Under
this interpretation, proof that Congress was at least neutral with re-
spect to additional private remedies would suffice. A close examina-
tion of Amtrak's language indicates that the latter alternative may be
the one intended by the Court. The Court stated that the maxim
expressio units est exclusio alterius compelled the conclusion that the
remedies provided were intended to be exclusive.' 09 Therefore, evi-
" The first alternative was the interpretation given Amtrak by the dissenting
judge in Cart, 496 F.2 at 426-29 (dissenting opinion).
" 422 U.S. at 82.
" Where there is evidence of an explicit purpose to deny a private cause of ac-
tion, however, even a member of a protected class will nut be allowed a private remedy.
Id.
" Id. at 82-84.
"414 U.S. at 458.
1d.
ton Id.
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(fence of a contrary legislative intent would be evidence that the rem-
edies provided in the statute were not, in fact, so intended. Neverthe-
less, the answer to this question remains uncertain.
Despite these minor ambiguities left by Amtrak and Cori, the clear
intent of the Court in each case appears to have been to slow the
rapid proliferation of implied private causes of action. This intent is
evident not only from the Court's use of a demanding four-part test,
but also from its stringent application of that test to the facts of the
Cart case.'" It appears that would-be plaintiffs will have a much more
difficult time in the future convincing federal courts to imply private
causes of action in their favor. It is submitted, however, that an evalu-
ation of Amtrak and Cart in light of the competing points of view on
implied remedies leads to the conclusion that the Amtrak-Cart rule
generally makes a rational and justifiable distinction between cases in
which implied remedies should and should not be allowed.
V. AN EVALUATION OF AMTRAK AN!) CURT
Many reasons have been advanced in support of the implication
of private causes of action from federal statutes.'" All of these may
be reduced to one basic contention: the court should imply a private
cause of action where it is desirable as a matter of social policy that
such a cause of action exist. Advocates of the implied remedies doc-
trine thus see the courts as architects of social policy in cases where
the legislature has failed to act.
Several considerations have been advanced in justification of this
"social policy" approach to implied remedies.'" Perhaps the most im-
portant consideration is the perceived need for a private right of ac-
tion in order to effectuate the purpose of a statute.'" It is reasoned
that if a statutory scheme of enforcement is ineffective in achieving
the statute's purpose, an implied private right of action which would
aid the enforcement of the statute would be desirable as a matter of
social policy." )5 A closely related consideration is the inadequacy of
The court of appeals applied much the same test in Cart as did the Supreme
Court, and yet it found that the plaintiff was a member of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, 496 F.2d at 422. and also that it would be appropriate,
in light of the statute's purposes, to afford the plaintiff the remedy sought, id. at
423-24. The Supreme Court, applying these tests more stringently, reached opposite
conclusions. See 422 U.S. at 80-84.
Gomm	 Eisberg, The Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 U. :11o. K.C.L. REV, 292,
297 -300 (1972); Comment, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454, 466- 67 (1968); Note, The Implication
of a Private Cause of Action Under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 47 S. CAI..
Rev, 383, 411-13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Private Cause of Action Under Title III];
Note, 51 TExAs L. Rev. 804, 806-07 (1973).
'" The Borah principle was described as a "social policy approach" in Private
Cause of Action Under Title III, supra note 102, at 411.
1 " Gamm & Eisberg, supra note 102, at 298; Comment, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454,
466 -67 (1968); Private Cause of Action Under Title III, supra note 102, at 413; Note, 51
TENAs L. Rev. 804, 806 (1973).
eos Gamm & Eisberg, supra note 102, at 298; Comment, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454,
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the administrative or criminal remedies available to the agency
charged with th law's enforcement.'" Where one suffers injury to his
person or property due to the unlawful acts of' another, and the sta-
tute violated does not provide compensation to the victim, an implied
private cause of' action similarly might be desirable as a matter of so-
cial policy."'
There is a competing viewpoint which maintains that a cou r t
should never imply a cause of action. This criticism of the implied
remedies doctrine may be reduced to two basic contentions: (1) the
implication of a private cause of action is an invasion by the judiciary
of the legislative function;' 8 and (2) the implication of a private cause
of action often unfairly subjects the offender to a different type or
level of liability than that which the statute expressly imposes on
him."'" The criticism concerning judicial invasion of the legislative
domain can be further subdivided into two branches: objections based
solely on the theory of the separation of powers;'" and objections
based on supposed institutional shortcomings of the judiciary as a
lawmaking mechanism, such as the judiciary's lack of public hearings
or debates, and its uncertain public mandate."'
The concern in Amtrak and Carl over the use of implied rem-
edies appears to have stemmed more from the considerations involved
in the separation of powers doctrine and the problems of judicial
legislation, than from the criticisms concerning the different type or
level of' liability which may be imposed by implied remedies." 2 While
these latter objections are not without merit, they may be answered
briefly. The more complicated constitutional objections will then be
considered.
A. Level of Liability
The concern that the doctrine of implied remedies unfairly sub-
466-67 (1968); Private Cause of Action Under Title 111 , supra note 102, at 413; Note, 51
Ti.xAs L. Rtly, 804, 806 (1973).
"" Comment, 63 Nw. U.L. RES'. 454, 469 (1968); Private Cause of Action Under
Title Ill , supra note 102, at 413; Note, 51 TENAs L. REv. 804, 806-07 (1973).
1117 Catlin] & Eisberg, supra note 102; suggest these additional sod policy
reasons in support of the implication of private actions: (1) private actions would coun-
teract agency non-neutrality which results from selective enforcement due to limited en-
forcement resources, id. at 299; (2) self-interest would motivate one with a private ac-
tion to persevere where an agency official might not, id. at 299-300; (3) private en-
forcement would free limited agency resources to deal with the most serious violators,
id. at 300; (4) private actions would remove blanket immunity that certain anti-social
behavior enjoys with respect to criminal laws that are not enforced, id.: and (5) a private
cause of action would help take the profit out of certain types of violations, id.
1118 Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc„ 456 F.2d 890, 805 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S, 1042 (1972); Note, 77 HA RV. L. RES'. 285, 291 (1963); Private Cause of Action Under
Title Ill, supra note 102, at 414.
"a Note, 77 HARv. L. REV. 285, 291-92 (1963).
3 " See, e.g., Chavez, v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1972).
'" Private Cause of Action Under Title Ill, supra note 102, at 414,
1 " See text accompanying notes 122 & 123 infra.
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jects an offender to a type or level of liability different from that
which the statute imposes on him is based on the differences between
regulatory legislation and tort law.'" The penalties and remedies pre-
scribed by regulatory statutes are proportionate to the relative seri-
ousness attributed to a particular offense. Tort damages, on the other
hand, are generally compensatory rather than based on the degree of
fault, and it is therefore argued that the implication of a civil remedy
may sometimes inflict a disproportionate punishment." 4
 It may be
replied to this objection that since the courts create the cause of ac-
tion, they may also set the limits of the remedy." 5
 Where appropriate,
damages could be limited to the amount of the defendant's unjust
enrichment,'" while in other instances plaintiffs could be limited to
injunctive relief only.'"
Critics of implied remedies also note that the application of a
regulatory statute is often tempered by administrative discretion, a
benefit that would be lost if private persons could sue to enforce the
statute.'" This is not, however, a necessary result; the relative impor-
tance of discretionary enforcement is one of the factors which courts
should take into account in determining whether a proposed private
cause of action would be consistent with effectuating a statute's pur-
poses.
Finally, it is argued that a private cause of action might impose
liability under a standard of proof lower than that established by the
statute." 9
 Whereas in a criminal prosecution the government would
have to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, in an implied pri-
vate cause of action under the same statute, the plaintiff would have
to meet only the preponderance of the evidence test.' 2 ° At the same
" 3 Note, 77 HAIM L. REV. 285, 291-92 (1963).
4 Id.
16 Id. at 296.
"6 It was held in Shapiro v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228 (2d Cir. 1974), that tippers and tippees who violate the duty to disclose or abstain
from trading will be liable for damages in an implied cause of action under Rule 106.5,
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1975), to all persons who, during the period in which the tippers
and tippees traded in or recommended trading in the stock concerned, purchased the
stock in the open market without knowledge of the material inside information in the
possession of the tippers and tippees, despite a lack of privity and reliance. Id. at 241. It
has been suggested that the damages recoverable in such a case should be limited to the
amount of the defendant's unjust enrichment, since a requirement that an illegal trader
make whole all those who were in the market during the relevant period would be
likely to inflict financial destruction upon the violator. Note, 16 B.C. IND. & Cost. L. REV.
503, 512-13 (1975). The court in Shapiro left to the district court the task of determin-
ing the proper measure of damages. 495 F.2d at 242.
" 7 Limiting plaintiff's to injunctive relief may deprive them of the incentive to
bring the suit that is provided by the possibility of money damages. Therefore, it may
be questioned whether allowing a private action for an injunction would help to make
effective the congressional purpose, and if not, whether the cause of action should be
allowed at all.
"" Note, 77 FlAtty. L. REV. 285, 291-92 (1963).
"B Gamm & Eisberg, supra note 102, at 301.
"5 Id.
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time, however, the different burdens of proof are predicated upon
the relative importance that society attaches to criminal convictions
and civil liabilities.' 2 ' Since a suit under an implied private cause of
action does not result in the penalty or stigma of a criminal convic-
don, it is submitted that a defendant in such a suit has no valid claim
to the greater protection afforded by the higher burden of proof re-
quired in criminal cases.
B. Deference to Legislative Intent
The Amtrak -Cart rule appears to take into account. both the social
policy arguments of implied remedy supporters and the judicial legis-
lation objections of the doctrine's critics. The concern in Amtrak and
Cori over the separation of powers doctrine is evidenced by the defer-
ence that the court pays to legislative intent, both presumed and ex-
plicit. Thus, the Court requires that a plaintiff either be a member of
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, or that he
show a specific legislative intent to create a private cause of action in
his favor.' 22 The Court also employs the maxim expressio units to raise
a presumption that it would be inconsistent with legislative intent to
imply a private cause of action under a statute which already provides
a remedy.' 2" Nevertheless, the fact that the Court did not flatly pro-
hibit the use of implied remedies suggests that it might have been
more concerned with the extent to which the separation of powers has
been violated in the past, rather than with the mere fact of its viola-
tion. Indeed, the implication of a private cause of action where there
is no evidence that Congress specifically intended to create such an ac-
tion — a result which would be permitted under the Amtrak -Cori.
rule' — is still essentially an act of judicial legislation, notwithstand-
ing the concern expressed for protected classes and consistency with
underlying congressional purposes. It thus appears that the effect and
intent of the Amtrak-Cot rule is to pay deference to the separation of
powers doctrine by limiting, while not eliminating, the use of implied
remedies.
It may be that the decision not to bar implied remedies entirely
results from the Court's recognition of the highly beneficial use that
121	 Society has judged that it is significantly worse for an innocent
man to be found guilty of a crime than fora guilty man to go free. The
consequences to the life, liberty and good name of the accused from an
erroneous conviction of a crime are usually more serious than the effects
of an erroneous judgment in a civil case. Therefore "fwlhere one party
has at stake an interest of transcending value — as a criminal defendant
his liberty — [the] margin of error is reduced as to him by ... placing on
the other party the burden ... of persuading the factfinder of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
McCoRmicws HANDBOOK OF ME LAW or EVIDENCE § 341(c), at 798 (2d ed. 1972).
122 422 U.S. at 82-84.
122 414 U.S. at 458.
124 See text accompanying notes 95 & 96 supra.
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has been made of implied remedies in the past. ' 2.5 Apparently, the
Court hesitates to completely eliminate this useful tool of social policy
where it can be employed without undue interference with the legisla-
tive prerogative. It is submitted that the minimal amount of judicial
legislation that will be involved in implying a remedy within the limits
of the Amtrak -Cori rule is far outweighed by the social policy benefits
that will accrue.
It is further submitted that requiring a plaintiff to show that an
implied remedy would be consistent with legislative intent is a rational
and justifiable factor in distinguishing between cases in which rem-
edies should and should not be allowed.' 2 " The rule gives due def-
erence to a co-equal branch of the government by requiring the
courts to refrain from doing that which Congress intended them not
to do. More importantly, however, it leaves the courts free, within the
boundaries set by due deference to congressional intent, to consider
whether an implied remedy would be desirable as a matter of social
policy.
One criticism that can be leveled at the Amtrak -Core test of con-
gressional intent, however; is that its use of the maxim expressio unius
goes further in paying deference to congressional intent than is either
necessary or desirable. Under the Amtrak -Cori rule, a plaintiff who is
not a member of a protected class has the burden of proving a
specific congressional intent to create a private remedy.' 27 This re-
quirement renders superfluous the presumption of congressional in-
tent not to allow additional remedies raised by expressio unius. On the
other hand, a plaintiff who is a member of a protected class does not
have to show that Congress specifically intended to create a private
cause of action in his favor; it is inferred that an implied remedy
would be consistent with legislative intent. 128 If, however, the statute
already provides a remedy, expressio units will raise a presumption that
Congress intended the remedy provided to be the exclusive means of
"5 Possibly the best example of the beneficial use to which implied remedies have
been put is in the area of securities taws. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967); Vine v. Benefi-
cial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Colonial Really
Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Stipp.
512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
1 " lt , is not, however, the only factor, A plaintiff who proves that Congress in-
tended to create his cause of action, but for some reason failed to do so, should be al-
lowed his remedy without more. On the other hand, a plaintiff who merely shows that
he is a member or a protected class, and therefore that it would be consistent with legis-
lative intent to imply a remedy, should he required to further justify the remedy
sought. Courts should not imply a remedy solely because it would be consistent with
legislative intent. Sec text at notes 49-53 supra.
12T See text accompanying note 97 supra.
"8 See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
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enforcing the Act. As noted earlier,' 29 it is uncertain whether the
plaintiff will then have to prove a specific congressional intent to
create an additional, private remedy, or merely congressional neutral-
ity with respect to additional remedies.
This use of expressio unius is unnecessary in that the court shows
sufficient deference for congressional intent by requiring the plaintiff
to prove that he is a member of the class for whose especial benefit.
the statute was enacted. Furthermore, such use of expressio unius is
undesirable in that it may prevent a plaintiff who has already proved
that Congress has granted him certain special rights from obtaining a
remedy for the violation of those rights. Although the maxim expressio
unius is a well established rule of statutory construction, its application
should be overridden by the social policy involved in the implication
of remedies. It is submitted that once a plaintiff has shown that he
has been granted certain rights tinder a statute, the court's only con-
cern should be whether it is desirable as a matter of social policy for
the plaintiff to have a private cause of action to enforce and protect
those rights.
C. Fidelity to Legislative Purpose
The second element of the Amtrak-Cort test is whether it would be
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply a remedy. On its face, this test seems as undemanding as the
one employed in Stewart v. Travelers . Corp. 13" Its application in Cori,
however, leaves little doubt that the test. is intended to be rigorous.
The Court did not merely examine whether the private cause of ac-
tion would be consistent with the Act's purposes, but rather whether
the remedy sought would aid Congress' primary purpose in enacting
the statute.m. Moreover, the Court was very demanding with respect
to whether the remedy sought would aid in the Act's enforcement. It.
rejected the argument that allowing a private remedy in this case
would have a deterrent effect on the persons against whose conduct
the statute was directed.' 32 Rather, the intent of the Court seems to be
to allow the courts to imply a remedy only where one is necessary in
order to effectuate a statute's purposes. Thus, the Borak test 123 has
been effectively resurrected.
Implying a remedy only where one is necessary to effectuate a
statute's purposes is another rational and justifiable factor in distin-
guishing between cases in which remedies should and should not. be  al-
lowed. The approach taken in Cort indicates that courts will not be al-
lowed to substitute a sweeping generalization of a statute's purposes
"" See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
11 " 503 17 .2d 108 (9th Cir, 1974). See text accompanying notes 41-52 supra.
422 U.S. at 84.
132 Id.
i" See text accompanying notes 17-39 supra.
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for a more narrow definition plainly indicated by the legislative
history.' 34
 Thus, to the extent that courts are accurate and restrained
in defining a statute's purposes, the concern for congressional pur-
pose, like the concern for congressional intent, will mitigate the judi-
cial legislation involved in implying remedies. Moreover, far from
being a violation of the separation of powers, implying a remedy
where one is necessary to effectuate Congress' purpose is a duty of
the courts.' 35
I t is submitted, however, that the social policy approach of
Amtrak and Cort is deficient in one respect. In determining whether
implying a remedy would be consistent with the underlying purpose
of the statute, Amtrak and Cort appear to concentrate solely on
whether an implied remedy would be necessary in order to effectuate
Congress' purpose. 'This question, in turn, seems to depend upon
whether the existence of the private action would have a deterrent ef-
fect on the type of conduct against which the statute is aimed. The
implied remedy's deterrent effect, however, is only one of the factors
which the court should consider in determining whether a private
remedy would be consistent with the statute's purposes. The court
should also consider whether it is desirable, as a matter of social pol-
icy, that the victim of illegal activity should be compensated for his
injuries.' 36 If so, then the court should imply a remedy, even though
the deterrent effect of the remedy may be questionable. Clearly, if the
intent of Congress was to grant a plaintiff and his class certain special
rights, it may very well be consistent with the congressional purpose to
give the plaintiff a remedy that provides him with compensation for
the invasion of those rights."'
D. State Remedies
Finally, under Amtrak-Cort the cause of action must not be one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law.' 38
 While this concern for federalism might
at first seem to be the most restrictive element of the Amtrak - Cort test,
it is not very restrictive at all. The Court concluded that it was not
1 " See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
135
	 is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the Congressional purpose." .1.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
1311 See Comment, 63 Nw. U.L. RE '. 454, 466-67 (1968).
should be noted that only a plaintiff who is a member of a protected class
will have the burden, or the opportunity, of showing that the remedy sought would be
consistent with the purposes of the statute. The rare plaintiff who can show that Con-
gress intended, but neglected, to create a private cause of action will already have won
his case; all others must either show they are members of a protected class, or fail the
first step of the Amtrak-Cori test.
"" 422 U.S. at 78.
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necessary for federal law to intrude into the states' domain in the Cart
case, since the existence of a derivative cause of action for damages
would not aid the primary goal of the statute.'" It may he inferred
that if the remedy sought were found to be consistent with legislative
intent and with the statute's underlying purpose, the fact that the
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law would not
preclude the court from implying a remedy. Thus, the Court may
well respect states' rights only in cases where it never intended to
imply a remedy. It is submitted that this is entirely proper. Unless the
federal statute involved exceeds Congress' constitutional authority, the
Court is fully justified in implying a federal cause of action for the
violation of a valid federal law, once it. is found that an implied rem-
edy would be consistent with legislative intent and with the statute's
underlying purpose. The last part of the Amtrak - Cart test, therefore,
will likely become a superfluous appendage, utilized to help justify a
decision to deny a remedy, and ignored when a contrary decision has
already been made.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's attitude towards implied remedies has un-
dergone a number of changes since the inception of the doctrine in
1916. Presently, the Court appears to intend a more limited use of
implied remedies, and it has set forth, in Amtrak and Cart, a test and a
method of application that. appear to be designed to accomplish that
end. The Amtrak-Cort test is a rational means of limiting the use of
implied remedies. At the same time it leaves courts free, within the
boundaries set by clue deference for legislative intent and fidelity to
legislative purpose, to imply remedies in cases in which it is desirable
as a matter of social policy that a remedy exist. This approach will re-
duce judicial legislation to a minimum without destroying a very use-
ful tool of social policy.
ROGER .). BRUNELLE
139 Id. at 84-85,
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